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Abstract
Americans with no religious affiliation (aka religious “Nones”) are not a politically 
homogeneous community. Just as there are political differences between groups of 
Christians, there are political differences between groups of religious Nones. I use 
nationally representative survey data to examine the political activities and per-
spectives of atheists, agnostics, and those who are “nothing in particular.” Results 
show that Americans who report that their religion is nothing in particular are rel-
atively uninterested in politics and unlikely to be politically active; atheists are rel-
atively liberal and likely to experience political conflict and follow political news; 
and agnostics are particularly likely to vote and feel politically isolated from their 
families. In many ways, the “softer” secularism of those who are nothing in partic-
ular is politically more similar to religious affiliates than the “harder” secularism 
of agnostics and especially atheists. These results have important implications for 
the future of American politics as Nones now have the potential to rival evangelical 
Protestants as a politically relevant constituency. 
Keywords: affiliation, atheism, none, politics. 
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Note: The data used for this study come from Wave 23 of the Pew Re-
search Center’s American Trends Panel. The data can be downloaded 
from the Pew Research Center website: https://www.pewresearch.org/
american-trends-panel-datasets/. 
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Introduction 
The number of Americans with no religious affiliation has grown 
dramatically in recent decades. According to the General Social Sur-
vey, while only 6 percent had no religious affiliation in 1991, this in-
creased to 14 percent in 2000, 18 percent in 2010, and 23 percent in 
2018 (Smith et al. 2019). Religious “Nones,” as they are often called, 
now constitute one of the three largest religious groups in the nation, 
along with Catholics and evangelical Protestants. Despite the inextri-
cable mingling of religious and political identities in the U.S. (Schw-
adel 2017; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014), we know little about the 
political implications of religious nonaffiliation, and even less about 
political variation among religious Nones (for exceptions, see Baker 
and Smith 2015 and Frost and Edgell 2018).1 
Religious Nones are more liberal and more likely to identify as 
Democrat than the average American (Baker and Smith 2015; Schw-
adel 2018); and liberal political perspectives may lead some people 
to become Nones (Campbell et al. 2018; Hout and Fischer 2014; Put-
nam and Campbell 2010). Aside from partisanship, however, there is 
a paucity of research on the politics of unaffiliated Americans (Wald 
and Calhoun-Brown 2014). How is nonaffiliation related to other po-
litical behaviors such as voting, feelings of political efficacy, and dis-
cussing politics with friends and family? An important contribution 
of this research note is to examine the relationship between religious 
nonaffiliation and various political behaviors. 
Just as there are politically relevant distinctions within religions, 
such as between evangelical and mainline Protestants, different types 
of Nones may be politically distinct from one another. The primary 
goal of this research note is to compare the political activities and per-
spectives of three mutually exclusive groups of Nones: atheists, ag-
nostics, and—the largest group—those who report that their religion 
1 Baker and Smith (2015) shed light on the politics of different unaffiliated Americans (e.g. 
atheists vs. agnostics) through bivariate associations. While their analysis is informative, it 
does not address potential mediating factors such as age, race, and education, which are as-
sociated with both religious (see Table 2) and political identities (see appendices). The cur-
rent analysis also explores a wider range of politically relevant outcomes. Frost and Edgell’s 
(2018) analytic approach is more similar to the one employed here, but they focus on civic 
participation, which is related to but distinct from the political behaviors and perspectives 
analyzed in this research note. 
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is “nothing in particular” (henceforth NIP).2 I focus on the political 
implications of these nonreligious identities, not on lack of belief in 
god(s), which does not always align with atheist and agnostic identi-
fication (Smith 2013). 
There are several reasons to expect atheists to be politically dis-
tinct from agnostics and especially NIPs. Atheism is a highly politi-
cized identity in the U.S. (Edgell et al. 2016; LeDrew 2013). As such, 
atheism may have specific political repercussions, as well as political 
antecedents (Campbell et al. 2018). Unlike agnosticism and NIP, athe-
ism is characterized by a hostility toward religion (Streib and Klein 
2013). Such hostility is likely to conflict with the perceived religiosity 
of the Republican constituency and conservative political ideologies 
that employ religious language (Calfano and Djupe 2009; Claassen et 
al. 2019). NIP, on the hand, reflects a “softer” secular identity (Kos-
min 2007), which may lead to fewer political differences with the re-
ligiously affiliated. Consequently, 
H1: Atheists are more liberal/Democrat and less conservative/Re-
publican than agnostics and especially NIPs 
Atheists, agnostics, and NIPs may differ politically in other ways as 
well. Atheists are more dogmatic and disagreeable than the average 
American (Zuckerman, Galen, Pasquale 2016). Atheists are also con-
siderably more likely than other Nones to oppose the influence of reli-
gion on politics (Baker and Smith 2015). Atheists’ dogmatism, disagree-
ableness, and vocal opposition to the politicization of religion suggest 
that they may be relatively effusive about their political positions. Thus, 
H2: Atheists are more likely than other Nones to talk about politics 
Differences between atheists, agnostics, and NIPs may extend to 
other forms of political activity as well. There has been considerable po-
litical mobilization of American atheists in the last few decades (Cimino 
and Smith 2014). According to LeDrew (2013:464), contemporary 
2 There are many other nonreligious identities in the U.S., such as humanist, freethinker, nat-
uralist, spiritualist, and bright. These groups constitute very small proportions of the Ameri-
can population and thus cannot be analyzed with representative survey data unless the sam-
ple is prohibitively large. 
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atheism “is an essentially political phenomenon.” Agnosticism and NIP, 
on the other hand, are less clearly defined identities; and, as such, may 
be associated with less political involvement and higher levels of polit-
ical apathy (Zuckerman et al. 2016). This aligns with Kosmin’s (2007) 
characterization of atheism as a “harder” form of secularism. 
H3: Atheists are more involved in politics than are other Nones 
This research note expands on previous research by (1) examining 
crucial distinctions among the Nones, (2) exploring a wide range of 
political outcomes, and (3) performing multivariate analyses that in-
clude potential mediating factors such as age, marital status, educa-
tion, and region of the country. Results show that Nones differ from 
the religiously affiliated and from one another on almost all the po-
litical outcomes in the analysis. Broadly speaking, NIPs are relatively 
uninterested in politics; atheists are disproportionately liberal, likely 
to experience political conflict, and likely to follow political news; and 
agnostics are particularly likely to vote and feel politically isolated 
from their families. I conclude by discussing the political implications 
of growing religious nonaffiliation and nonbelief in the United States. 
Data and methods 
The data are from Wave 23 of Pew Research Center’s American 
Trends Panel (ATP), conducted November 29 to December 12, 2016 
among 4,183 respondents. The ATP is a nationally representative panel 
of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey is self-administered on-
line. Panelists who do not have internet access are provided a tablet 
and wireless internet connection. For more information on the ATP, 
see Pew Research Center (2016). The survey is suited to the current 
research because it includes a variety of questions about political per-
spectives and behaviors—being soon after the 2016 presidential elec-
tion—and includes a measure of religious affiliation that distinguishes 
between atheists, agnostics, and other Nones. 
There are 13 dependent variables, which are divided into three 
broad categories: political behavior and interest, politics and social 
interactions, and partisanship and ideology (see Table 1 for descrip-
tive statistics). I use three measures of political behavior and interest. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Percent (Mean)  Std. Deviation  N 
Dependent variables 
Validated vote  65.4%   3,823 
Political efficacy  58.7%   4,068 
Followed election  (3.23)  .76  4,095 
Share political views with family  66.6%   4,049 
Family OK talking about politics  60.2%   4,075 
Talked Pres. election last week  65.0%   4,105 
Argument over 2016 election  4,094 
 None  61.6% 
 Minor  29.0% 
 Major  9.4% 
Political party    4,087 
 Democrat  33.6% 
 Republican  26.9% 
 Independent  39.4% 
Republican/lean republican  44.4%   4,018 
Voted for    3,055 
 Trump  43.3% 
 Clinton  46.8% 
 Other  10.0% 
Political ideology    4,093 
 Liberal  25.9% 
 Moderate  39.9% 
 Conservative  34.3% 
Dem. party represents interests  51.7%   4,073 
Repub. party represents interests  46.3%   4,073 
 
Independent variables 
Affiliated  71.8%   4,105 
Nothing in particular (NIP)  16.4%   4,105 
Atheist  5.8%   4,105 
Agnostic  6.0%   4,105 
Married  46.9%   4,105 
Cohabit  11.7%   4,105 
Single  41.5%   4,105 
South  37.3%   4,105 
Bachelor’s degree  29.9%   4,105 
Income  (4.62)  2.36  4,105 
Age  (46.90)  16.58  4,105 
Female  52.4%   4,105 
African American  11.7%   4,105 
Latino  15.1%   4,105 
Other race  9.4%   4,105 
White  63.8%   4,105 
Note: Weighted percentages/means. 
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First, a dichotomous variable indicating a validated vote in the 2016 
election (1 = voted). Self-reports of voting are susceptible to response 
bias, with as much as 20 percent of nonvoters saying they voted (Cas-
sel 2003). Consequently, I use a validated vote measure rather than 
self-reports. Ninety-one percent of respondents were matched to five 
commercial databases that contain information about voter turnout 
for nearly every U.S. adult. Respondents who were verified as hav-
ing voted in at least one database are considered to have voted. The 
proportion of respondents who voted using the validated voter data 
is much closer to election results than are self-reports of voting (see 
Pew Research Center 2018 for more on validated vote data). Second, 
political efficacy is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for support for the 
idea that “ordinary citizens can do a lot to influence the government 
in Washington if they are willing to make the effort” and 0 for the 
view that “there is not much ordinary citizens can do to influence the 
government in Washington.” Third, political interest is assessed with 
an ordinal variable gauging how closely respondents followed news 
about candidates for the 2016 presidential election (1 = not closely at 
all, 4 = very closely). 
Four variables examine social interactions related to politics. 
First, a dichotomous variable indicating most or almost everyone 
in the respondent’s family shares their political views (vs. a few 
family members or no one in family shares their political views). 
Second, a dichotomous variable indicating that the respondent’s 
family is generally okay talking about politics (vs. family tries to 
avoid talking politics). Third, a dichotomous variable coded 1 for 
those who had a conversation about the 2016 presidential election 
in the last seven days and 0 for those who did not. Fourth, a cate-
gorical variable comparing those who report having a major argu-
ment about the 2016 election, a minor argument, and no argument 
about the election. 
The final set of dependent variables examines party and ideology. 
Political party is a categorical variable: Democrat, Republican, and 
Independent/other party. Most Independents lean toward the Demo-
cratic or Republican Party (Klar and Krupnikov 2016; Pew Research 
Center 2019). Thus, the second party measure is a dichotomous vari-
able coded 1 for those who are Republican or lean toward the Re-
publican Party and 0 for those who are Democrat or lean toward the 
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Democratic Party.3  Ideology is a categorical variable: conservative/
very conservative, moderate, and liberal/very liberal. Another cat-
egorical variable assesses who the respondent voted for in the 2016 
presidential election variable: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, or an-
other candidate (nonvoters removed from model). The final two de-
pendent variables are dichotomous measures of agreeing that the Re-
publican (or Democratic) “party represents the interests of people like 
you” very or somewhat well (vs. not too well or not at all). 
The focal independent variables are dummy variables for differ-
ent categories of self-identified religious nonaffiliates: atheists (N = 
269), agnostics (N = 284), and NIPs (N = 529). Religious affiliates (N 
= 3,023) serve as the omitted reference group. Full models include 
controls for sex (female = 1, male = 0), race (dummy variables for Af-
rican American, Latino, and other race, with White as the reference 
group), education (bachelor’s degree = 1, no bachelor’s = 0), mar-
ital status (dummy variables for married and cohabiting, with not 
currently married or cohabiting as reference group), region (South 
Census Region = 1, other regions = 0), family income (1 = less than 
$10,000, 9 = $150,000 or more), and age (19 to 93). 
Table 2 highlights the importance of including the control variables 
in the models by showing that they vary considerably across the re-
ligious affiliation categories. For instance, affiliated respondents are 
relatively likely to be married, older, and live in the South. There is 
also considerable variation among the Nones. Atheists, for example, 
are more likely than NIPs to be married and male; agnostics are the 
most likely to have a bachelor’s degree; and NIPs have considerably 
lower family incomes than either atheists or agnostics. 
I employ three types of regression models: multinomial logistic 
models for categorical dependent variables (political party, ideology, 
vote choice, and political arguments), ordinal logistic models for the 
one ordinal dependent variable (following election news), and binary 
logistic models for the remaining dependent variables, which are all 
dichotomous. For each dependent variable, there is a partial model 
3 After respondents are asked about their party affiliation, a follow-up question about lean-
ing toward the Democratic or Republican Party is asked of all respondents who do not iden-
tify as Democrat or Republican. Ninety-one of the 1,561 respondents who received the party 
lean question refused to answer (which includes the 19 respondents who refused to answer 
the party affiliation question). Those 91 respondents are removed from the analysis of Re-
publican/Lean Republican. 
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with religious affiliation/identification measures but no controls, and 
a full model that also includes control variables. All models were con-
ducted in Stata 14 and weighted to account for differential probabil-
ities of selection into the panel and differential nonresponse to the 
panel recruitment survey. To highlight the substantive importance of 
the findings, the results section presents predicted probabilities for 
the religiously affiliated, NIPs, atheists, and agnostics (at the means 
of other variables in model). Significance tests are conducted for each 
pairwise comparison.4 Because atheism and agnosticism are relatively 
rare identities, and thus, there are fewer respondents in those catego-
ries, I flag differences that are significant at p < .1 as well as p < .05. 
Complete model results are shown in the appendices. 
Results 
Table 3 reports predicted probabilities for religious affiliates, NIPs, 
atheists, and agnostics for all 13 political outcomes. Starting with 
voting, the most basic form of democratic political participation, the 
partial model shows that religious affiliates (probability = .67) and 
Table 2: Demographic variables within religious affiliation categories 
 Affiliated  NIP  Atheist  Agnostic 
Percent married  50.8%  35.7%  40.3%  36.2% 
Percent cohabit  8.6%  21.2%  15.5%  18.6% 
Percent south  40.9%  29.1%  22.0%  30.5% 
Percent bachelor’s degree  29.4%  22.9%  40.0%  44.9% 
Mean income  4.56  4.33  5.59  5.17 
Mean age  49.25  40.90  40.52  41.37 
Percent female  54.4%  51.4%  33.5%  49.6% 
Percent African American  12.8%  10.5%  6.8%  7.4% 
Percent Latino  16.0%  18.1%  5.4%  5.1% 
Percent other race  10.0%  9.2%  8.7%  3.0% 
Notes: Weighted; N = 4,105. 
NIP = nothing in particular. 
4 Predicted probabilities and related significance tests are derived using the margins and pw 
compare (at means) postestimation options in Stata. 
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agnostics (.75) are significantly more likely than NIPs (.54) to vote. In 
the full model, the difference between affiliates and NIPs is reduced 
and no longer significant but the probability of voting for agnostics 
(.76) continues to be higher than for NIPs (.63). 
Table 3: Predicted probabilities from partial and full models of political activities and perspectives 
                                                                                                            Independent Variables 
                                                                                Partial model                                                   Full model 
Dependent Variable  Affiliated NIP         Atheist     Agnostic   Affiliated       NIP          Atheist     Agnostic  
  (a) (b) (c)    (a) (b) (c)  N
Political Behavior and Interest 
Validated vote  .67a  .54c  .66  .75  .70  .63c  .67  .76  3,823 
Political efficacy  .60a  .51  .59  .59  .60a  .51  .59  .61  4,068 
Followed election very closely  .47a,b  .40b  .62  .51  .46b  .43b  .63  .51  4,095 
Politics and social interactions 
Share political views w/family  .71b,c  .69c  .65c  .58  .69b,c  .65c  .58  .54  4,049 
Family OK talking politics  .62a  .55  .56  .54  .62  .57  .54  .54  4,075 
Talked Pres. election last week  .65a,b  .54b,c  .86c  .72  .67a,b  .58b,c  .86c  .71  4,105 
Argument over 2016 election          4,094 
 None  .64b,c  .65b,c  .36c  .54  .63a,b  .68b  .43c  .61 
 Minor  .27b  .28b  .50c  .36  .28b  .26b  .44c  .30 
 Major  .09  .07b  .15  .10  .09a  .06b  .13  .09 
Partisanship and Ideology 
Political party          4,087 
 Democrat  .33c  .34  .37  .42  .31b,c  .34b,c  .45  .49 
 Republican  .32a,b,c  .17b,c  .07  .09  .30a,b,c  .16b,c  .05  .06 
 Independent  .35a,b,c  .49  .56  .49  .39a,b  .50  .50  .45 
Republican/Lean Republican  .51a,b,c  .34b,c  .18  .24  .50a,b,c  .32b,c  .12  .18  4,018 
Ideology          4,093 
 Liberal  .20a,b,c  .34b  .59c  .39  .20a,b,c  .33b  .57c  .35 
 Moderate  .40b  .42b  .29c  .44  .41b  .42b  .31c  .47 
 Conservative  .40a,b,c  .24b  .13  .17  .39a,b,c  .25b  .13  .17 
Voted For          3,055 
 Donald Trump  .50a,b,c  .26  .16  .22  .49a,b,c  .23b  .11  .17 
 Hillary Clinton  .41a,b,c  .60  .67  .65  .42a,b,c  .66  .75  .73 
 Other  .08  .15  .16  .12  .09  .12  .14  .09 
Dem. Represents Interests  .47a,b,c  .62  .62  .69  .47a,b,c  .61c  .68  .74  4,073 
Repub. Represents Interests  .53a,b,c  .33  .25  .25  .53a,b,c  .32b,c  .20  .21  4,073 
Notes: NIP = nothing in particular; partial models include only religious affiliation/identification measures; full models also include 
controls for age, race, sex, education, family income, marital status, and region; models of party, ideology, vote choice, and political 
arguments are multinomial logistic regressions; models of following election are ordinal logistic regressions; all other models are 
binary logistic regressions; see appendices for complete model results. 
a. Differs significantly from NIP (superscript = p < .05, subscript = p < .1) (two-tailed test). 
b. Differs significantly from atheist (superscript = p < .05, subscript = p < .1) (two-tailed test). 
c. Differs significantly from agnostic (superscript = p < .05, subscript = p < .1) (two-tailed test). 
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Continuing with political behaviors and interest, the partial model 
shows that religiously affiliated Americans (.60) are more likely than 
NIPs (.51) to report feeling politically efficacious. The affiliated, how-
ever, are no more likely than atheists or agnostics (both .59) to feel 
politically efficacious. These results are largely unaffected by the ad-
dition of control variables. Turning to following political news, the re-
sults show that religious affiliates (.46) and NIPs (.43) are the least 
likely to follow election news very closely, and atheists (.63) the most 
likely (full model). Overall, these results suggest that NIPs are less in-
terested in politics than are atheists and agnostics. 
The next set of models focus on social interactions and politics. 
Atheists (.58) and agnostics (.54) are less likely than religious affil-
iates (.69) to report sharing political views with their families (full 
model). NIPs (.65) are not significantly different from religious affil-
iates, and they are more likely than agnostics to share political views 
with their families. Despite being less likely to share political views 
with their families, atheists and agnostics are not significantly less 
likely than religious affiliates to say it is okay to talk about politics 
with their families (partial and full models). 
Atheists stand out when it comes to conversations and confronta-
tions about politics. The full model of having talked about the presi-
dential election in the last week shows NIPs (.58) are particularly un-
likely to have such conversations while atheists (.86) are particularly 
likely to do so. Religious affiliates (.67) and agnostics (.71) fall in be-
tween. Atheists are also relatively likely to have an argument about 
the election. Atheists (.44) are more likely than the affiliated (.28), 
NIPs (.26), and agnostics (.30) to have a minor political argument; and 
they (.13) are more likely (p < .1) than NIPs (.06) to have a major ar-
gument (full model). These results suggest that atheists are particu-
larly politically engaged, and, again, that NIPs as relatively unengaged. 
The final set of models examines partisanship and ideology. As 
expected, all three groups of Nones are all considerably less likely 
than religious affiliates (.30) to report Republican identification (full 
model). But there is also notable variation among the Nones, with 
NIPs (.16) being significantly more likely than atheists (.05) and ag-
nostics (.06) to identify with the Republican Party. Atheists and ag-
nostics make up for their low rates of Republican identification with 
high rates of identification with the Democratic Party (.45 and .49, 
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respectively). NIPs (.34), on the other hand, are no more likely than 
religious affiliates (.31) to identify as Democrat. All three groups of 
Nones are far less likely than religious affiliates (.50) to identify as Re-
publican or lean toward the Republican Party (full model). NIPs (.32) 
are also more likely than atheists (.12) and agnostics (.18) to identify 
as Republican or lean toward the Republican Party. 
The pattern for ideology is similar to party, though in this case ag-
nostics behave more like NIPs than atheists. In the full model, religious 
affiliates (.20) are less likely than all three groups of Nones to report 
being liberal, though atheists (.57) are far more likely than both NIPs 
(.33) and agnostics (.35) to be liberal. Conversely, religious affiliates 
(.39) are more likely than all three groups of Nones to identify as con-
servative, though atheists (.13) are even less likely than NIPs (.25) to 
report being conservative. 
Reflecting the above differences in party and ideology, religious af-
filiates (.49) are more likely than all three groups of Nones to have 
voted for Donald Trump, and less likely (.42) to have voted for Hillary 
Clinton (full model). Atheists (.11) again stand out among the Nones, 
being about half as likely as NIPs (.23) to have voted for Trump. 
When it comes to views of the parties, religious affiliates are far 
more likely than all three groups of Nones to say the Republican Party 
represents the interests of people like them, and far less likely to say 
the Democratic Party represents them. More interesting, however, are 
the differences among the Nones. In the full models, NIPs (.61) are less 
likely than agnostics (.74) to say the Democratic Party represents peo-
ple like them, and NIPs (.32) are more likely than both atheists (.20) 
and agnostics (.21) to say the Republican Party represents people like 
them. Overall, the partisanship and ideology results show that NIPs 
are less liberal/Democratic (or more conservative/Republican) than 
agnostics and especially atheists. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The goal of this research note is to provide clarity on the political 
perspectives and behaviors of different groups of religious Nones. As 
previous research shows (e.g., Baker and Smith 2015; Wald and Cal-
houn-Brown 2014), religious Nones are more liberal than religious 
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affiliates, and more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. While 
this is true of Nones a whole, agnostics, atheists, and NIPs are politically 
quite different from one another. As the above results show, atheists are 
more liberal than other Nones,which support Hypothesis 1. Addition-
ally, both atheists and agnostics are more likely than NIPs to support 
the Democratic Party, and less likely than NIPs to support the Republi-
can Party. These findings suggest that the “softer” secularism (Kosmin 
2007) of a NIP identity is more amendable to conservative politics than 
the “harder” secularism of agnostic and especially atheist identities. 
Although some research suggests that religious Nones are relatively 
unlikely to be politically active (e.g., Jones et al. 2016), the above re-
sults paint a more nuanced picture of nonaffiliates’ political activities. 
NIPs—the largest group of Nones—are less likely than the religiously 
affiliated to vote, but this difference is mediated by the control vari-
ables. Even with controls in the model, however, agnostics remain 
more likely than NIPs to vote. NIPs are also less likely than the reli-
giously affiliated to feel politically efficacious and to talk about the 
election. These results suggest that NIPs are not very politically ac-
tive and that they are relatively uninterested in politics. But the same 
cannot be said of atheists and agnostics. This finding aligns with Frost 
and Edgell’s (2018) analysis of civic participation, where they find that 
NIPs are relatively uninterested in local community affairs. As Frost 
and Edgell (2018:433) suggest, NIPs’ political apathy may reflect a 
more marginal status than other Nones due to the “inherent status 
inconsistency and value uncertainty” of being nothing in particular. 
Unlike NIPs, atheists are relatively politically active and interested 
in politics. They are more likely than agnostics, NIPs, and the reli-
giously affiliated to talk about the presidential election, which sup-
ports the second hypothesis. Atheists are also more likely than NIPs 
and the religiously affiliated to follow news about the election, which 
lends some support to the third hypotheses. This comports with re-
search on the political mobilization of atheists (Cimino and Smith 
2014) and the politicization of contemporary atheism (Edgell et al. 
2016; LeDrew 2013). Nonetheless, such political mobilization does not 
lead atheists to be any more likely than religious affiliates to vote or 
feel politically efficacious. Overall, the results indicate that agnostics 
and atheists are often more politically active than NIPs, and on some 
measures, atheists are more politically active than the religiously af-
filiated as well. Agnostics’ relatively high level of political activity is 
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an interesting finding, which may be related to Baker and Smith’s 
(2015) characterization of agnostics as a knowledgeable population 
with a strong emphasis on philosophy and reason. Additional research 
is needed to shed light on how agnostics understand the relationship 
between their religious and political identities. 
There is also considerable political variation among the Nones when 
it comes to families and politics. The results show that atheists and ag-
nostics, but not NIPs, are less likely than religious affiliates to report 
sharing political values with their families. Their partisanship and lib-
eral leanings likely make them politically distinct from other members 
of their families. Still, atheists and agnostics are not any more likely 
to report discomfort with talking to their families about politics. This 
is surprising not only because atheists and agnostics are often polit-
ically different from their families but also because atheists are rela-
tively likely to have arguments about the 2016 election. Qualitative re-
search on how unaffiliated Americans navigate religion, politics, and 
family could shed light on the ways that agnostics and atheists appear 
to separate their political differences from their familial interactions. 
This research note demonstrates that not only are religiously unaf-
filiated Americans politically distinct from those with a religious af-
filiation, but, more importantly, they are politically distinct from one 
another. Religious Nones are not a monolithic group. Unlike NIPs, 
atheists and agnostics are almost never Republican, but atheists are 
far more likely than agnostics to be liberal. How might this affect 
their support for specific issues and candidates? Atheists are espe-
cially likely to follow election news and have conversations about the 
election. As atheism becomes more common in the United States (Pew 
Research Center 2015), atheists’ political mobilization may become a 
potent factor in local and national politics. On the other hand, NIPs 
are relatively uninterested in politics and more likely than other Nones 
to identify as Republican and conservative. It is possible that a sizable 
segment of the NIP community may eventually become an important 
part of the Republican constituency, if the Republican Party can ef-
fectively mobilize them. In conclusion, the results here highlight the 
high levels of internal political diversity among religious nonaffiliates. 
Now that there are as many Nones as there are Catholics and evangel-
ical Protestants in the United Search., research on religion and pol-
itics, and even political projections based on demographic distribu-
tions, will have to account for such political diversity. 
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Appendices for “The Politics of Religious Nones” 
 
Table A1. Binary Logistic Regressions of Voting and Political Efficacy, and Ordinal Logistic Regressions of Followed Election 
 Validated Vote Political Efficacy Followed Election  
 Model A1.1 Model A1.2 Model A1.3 Model A1.4 Model A1.5 Model A1.6 
NIP -0.56 *** -0.30  -0.40 * -0.38 * -0.31 * -0.12     
 [0.17]  [0.19]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.15]  [0.15]     
Atheist -0.08  -0.12  -0.07  -0.05  0.58 ** 0.68 **  
 [0.29]  [0.34]  [0.24]  [0.24]  [0.22]  [0.25]     
Agnostic 0.39  0.32  -0.04  0.01  0.13  0.23     
 [0.28]  [0.32]  [0.22]  [0.23]  [0.24]  [0.27]     
Female   0.34 *   0.04    -0.19 †    
   [0.14]    [0.12]    [0.11]     
Age   0.03 ***   0.00    0.03 *** 
   [0.00]    [0.00]    [0.00]     
African Amer.   -0.15    -0.14    -0.13     
   [0.25]    [0.20]    [0.23]     
Latino   -0.46 *   0.41 *   0.11     
   [0.20]    [0.20]    [0.18]     
Other Race   -0.91 ***   0.34    -0.16     
   [0.25]    [0.22]    [0.19]     
Bachelor   0.69 ***   -0.02    0.41 *** 
   [0.15]    [0.12]    [0.11]     
Income   0.20 ***   0.03    0.09 *** 
   [0.04]    [0.03]    [0.03]     
Married   -0.09    -0.07    0.04     
   [0.17]    [0.13]    [0.13]     
Cohabit   -0.33    -0.04    0.17     
   [0.23]    [0.21]    [0.18]     
South   -0.56 ***   -0.17    -0.12     
   [0.14]    [0.12]    [0.12]     
Constant 0.72 *** 0.16  0.42 *** 0.32 † -2.96 *** -2.82 ***    
 [0.08]  [0.23]  [0.07]  [0.19]  [0.15]  [0.22]     
N 3,823  3,823  4,068  4,068  4,095  4,095  
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in brackets. 




Table A2. Binary Logistic Regressions of Sharing Political Views with Family, Family Okay Talking about Politics, and Talking 
about the Presidential Election in the Last Week 
 Shares Political Views with Family Family OK Talking about Politics Talked Pres. Election Last Week 
 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A2.3 Model A2.4 Model A2.5 Model A2.6 
NIP -0.09  -0.18  -0.28 † -0.21  -0.46 ** -0.36 *   
 [0.10]  [0.17]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.17]     
Atheist -0.25 † -0.49 * -0.24  -0.33  1.21 *** 1.10 *** 
 [0.13]  [0.25]  [0.24]  [0.25]  [0.35]  [0.33]     
Agnostic -0.57 *** -0.65 ** -0.34  -0.35  0.34  0.20     
 [0.13]  [0.23]  [0.23]  [0.22]  [0.29]  [0.30]     
Female   0.04    -0.35 **   -0.37 **  
   [0.12]    [0.12]    [0.13]     
Age   0.01 *   0.00    0.02 *** 
   [0.00]    [0.00]    [0.00]     
African Amer.   0.77 **   0.59 *   -0.16     
   [0.24]    [0.23]    [0.23]     
Latino   -0.03    -0.24    -0.23     
   [0.21]    [0.19]    [0.20]     
Other Race   -0.31    0.42 †   -0.32     
   [0.21]    [0.23]    [0.23]     
Bachelor   -0.04    0.13    0.61 *** 
   [0.12]    [0.12]    [0.14]     
Income   0.07 *   0.06 *   0.16 *** 
   [0.03]    [0.03]    [0.03]     
Married   0.03    0.13    -0.02     
   [0.14]    [0.14]    [0.15]     
Cohabit   0.13    0.08    0.38     
   [0.22]    [0.21]    [0.23]     
South   -0.09    0.20    0.02     
   [0.13]    [0.13]    [0.14]     
Constant 0.88 *** 0.48 * 0.50 *** 0.14  0.62 *** 0.09     
 [0.04]  [0.19]  [0.07]  [0.19]  [0.07]  [0.19]     
N 4,049  4,049  4,075  4,075  4,105  4,105  
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in brackets. 




Table A3. Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Argument over Election 
 (Dependent Variable Reference Category = No Argument) 
 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 
 Major Argument Minor Argument Major Argument Minor Argument 
NIP -0.35  0.02  -0.55 *   -0.18     
 [0.26]  [0.17]  [0.26]     [0.17]     
Atheist 1.01 ** 1.18 *** 0.70 † 0.81 *** 
 [0.36]  [0.24]  [0.39]     [0.24]     
Agnostic 0.27  0.44 † -0.06     0.09     
 [0.31]  [0.25]  [0.30]     [0.26]     
Female     -0.01     -0.2     
     [0.19]     [0.13]     
Age     -0.02 *** -0.01 *** 
     [0.01]     [0.00]     
African Amer.     -0.10     -0.18     
     [0.38]     [0.24]     
Latino     -0.59 †    -0.38 †    
     [0.30]     [0.21]     
Other Race     0.19     -0.08     
     [0.36]     [0.23]     
Bachelor     0.39 *   0.26 *   
     [0.20]     [0.13]     
Income     0.01     0.09 **  
     [0.05]     [0.03]     
Married     0.17     -0.05     
     [0.23]     [0.14]     
Cohabit     0.48     0.65 **  
     [0.32]     [0.22]     
South     -0.07     -0.15     
     [0.20]     [0.14]     
Constant -1.91 *** -0.86 *** -2.20 *** -1.19 *** 
 [0.11]  [0.07]  [0.33]     [0.20]     
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in brackets, N= 4,094. 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
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Table A4. Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Party Identification 
 (Dependent Variable Reference Category = Independent/Other Party) 
 Model A4.1 Model A4.2 
 Democrat Republican Democrat Republican 
NIP -0.32 † -0.98 *** -0.13     -0.86 *** 
 [0.18]  [0.22]  [0.18]     [0.22]     
Atheist -0.36  -1.95 *** 0.12     -2.00 *** 
 [0.23]  [0.59]  [0.23]     [0.59]     
Agnostic -0.09  -1.66 *** 0.32     -1.69 *** 
 [0.24]  [0.35]  [0.25]     [0.37]     
Female     0.61 *** 0.08     
     [0.14]     [0.15]     
Age     0.01 *** 0.01 *   
     [0.00]     [0.00]     
African Amer.     1.43 *** -1.78 *** 
     [0.22]     [0.50]     
Latino     0.95 *** -1.05 *** 
     [0.21]     [0.27]     
Other Race     0.58 *   -0.72 *   
     [0.24]     [0.30]     
Bachelor     0.25 †    -0.34 *   
     [0.14]     [0.15]     
Income     -0.01     0.05     
     [0.03]     [0.04]     
Married     -0.06     0.04     
     [0.16]     [0.17]     
Cohabit     -0.12     -0.52 †    
     [0.24]     [0.31]     
South     -0.13     0.30 †    
     [0.15]     [0.16]     
Constant -0.07  -0.08  -0.81 *** -0.04     
 [0.08]  [0.08]  [0.21]     [0.25]     
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in brackets, N= 4,087. 





Table A5. Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Political Ideology 
 (Dependent Variable Reference Category = Moderate) 
 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 
 Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative 
NIP 0.49 ** -0.54 ** 0.45 *   -0.46 * 
 [0.18]  [0.21]  [0.19]     [0.22]  
Atheist 1.40 *** -0.79 † 1.32 *** -0.83 † 
 [0.26]  [0.46]  [0.25]     [0.48]  
Agnostic 0.57 * -0.98 * 0.42 †    -0.94 * 
 [0.23]  [0.39]  [0.23]     [0.40]  
Female     0.14     -0.25 † 
     [0.14]     [0.14]  
Age     -0.00     0.01  
     [0.00]     [0.00]  
African Amer.     0.15     -0.61 * 
     [0.25]     [0.26]  
Latino     -0.13     -0.51 * 
     [0.23]     [0.24]  
Other Race     0.14     0.03  
     [0.27]     [0.24]  
Bachelor     0.51 *** -0.24 † 
     [0.15]     [0.14]  
Income     0.02     -0.01  
     [0.04]     [0.03]  
Married     -0.19     0.23  
     [0.17]     [0.16]  
Cohabit     0.41 †    -0.27  
     [0.24]     [0.27]  
South     -0.03     0.17  
     [0.16]     [0.14]  
Constant -0.68 *** -0.00  -1.00 *** 0.26  
 [0.09]  [0.07]  [0.24]     [0.22]  
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in brackets, N= 4,093. 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
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Table A6. Binary Logistic Regressions of Republican/Lean Republican and View that Party Represents Interests of People Like Them 
  
Republican/Lean Republican 
Democratic Party Represents 
Interests of People Like Them 
Republican Party Represents 
Interests of People Like Them 
 Model A6.1 Model A6.2 Model A6.3 Model A6.4 Model A6.5 Model A6.6 
NIP -0.67 *** -0.73 *** 0.59 *** 0.58 ** -0.84 *** -0.88 *** 
 [0.17]  [0.18]     [0.16]  [0.18]  [0.16]  [0.17]     
Atheist -1.53 *** -1.99 *** 0.61 * 0.89 *** -1.21 *** -1.52 *** 
 [0.32]  [0.32]     [0.25]  [0.26]  [0.31]  [0.30]     
Agnostic -1.19 *** -1.53 *** 0.93 *** 1.15 *** -1.21 *** -1.42 *** 
 [0.26]  [0.28]     [0.22]  [0.24]  [0.28]  [0.29]     
Female   -0.45 ***   0.43 ***   -0.36 **  
   [0.13]       [0.12]    [0.12]     
Age   0       -0.00    -0.00     
   [0.00]       [0.00]    [0.00]     
African Amer.   -2.56 ***   1.65 ***   -2.14 *** 
   [0.33]       [0.24]    [0.26]     
Latino   -1.59 ***   1.32 ***   -1.09 *** 
   [0.22]       [0.22]    [0.21]     
Other Race   -0.99 ***   0.87 ***   -0.73 **  
   [0.23]       [0.22]    [0.23]     
Bachelor   -0.36 **    0.46 ***   -0.65 *** 
   [0.12]       [0.12]    [0.12]     
Income   0.02       -0.04    0.04     
   [0.03]       [0.03]    [0.03]     
Married   0.26 †      -0.2    0.24     
   [0.14]       [0.13]    [0.15]     
Cohabit   -0.2       0.39    -0.38     
   [0.23]       [0.22]    [0.22]     
South   0.32 *     -0.27 *   0.35 **  
   [0.14]       [0.13]    [0.13]     
Constant 0.02  0.68 **  -0.12  -0.61 ** 0.12  0.58 **  
 [0.07]  [0.21]     [0.07]  [0.19]  [0.07]  [0.20]     
N 4,018  4,018  4,073  4,073  4,073  4,073  
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; N=4,073. 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
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Table A7. Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Vote Choice in 2016 Presidential Election 
 (Dependent Variable Reference Category = Hillary Clinton) 
 Model A7.1 Model A7.2 
 Donald Trump Other Candidate Donald Trump Other Candidate 
NIP -1.05 *** 0.2  -1.22 *** -0.19     
 [0.22]  [0.35]  [0.23]     [0.39]     
Atheist -1.62 *** 0.18  -2.11 *** -0.12     
 [0.38]  [0.39]  [0.34]     [0.39]     
Agnostic -1.28 *** -0.07  -1.59 *** -0.52     
 [0.36]  [0.34]  [0.41]     [0.38]     
Female     -0.69 *** -0.24     
     [0.16]     [0.21]     
Age     0     -0.03 *** 
     [0.00]     [0.01]     
African Amer.     -3.51 *** -1.45 **  
     [0.60]     [0.53]     
Latino     -1.55 *** -1.15 **  
     [0.34]     [0.43]     
Other Race     -0.76 *   -0.56     
     [0.32]     [0.38]     
Bachelor     -1.16 *** -0.45 *   
     [0.16] †    [0.20]     
Income     0.07     -0.12 *   
     [0.04]     [0.06]     
Married     0.55 **  0.42     
     [0.18]     [0.29]     
Cohabit     0     0.42     
     [0.33]     [0.40]     
South     0.26     -0.01     
     [0.17]     [0.26]     
Constant 0.2 ** -1.59 *** 0.78 **  -0.62 †    
 [0.08]  [0.14]  [0.26]     [0.35]     
Notes: Table reports coefficients, standard errors in brackets, N=3,055. 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
 
 
